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1 Introduction
Most vertical R&D-driven growth models (such as Grossman-Helpman (1991), Segerstrom
(1998), Aghion-Howitt (1998, Ch.3)) focus on the symmetric equilibrium in the research
sector, that is, on that path characterized by an equal size of R&D investments in each
industry. In these models the engine of growth is technological progress, which stems
from R&D investment decisions taken by prot-maximizing agents. By means of re-
search, each product line can be improved an innite number of times, and the rms
manufacturing the most updated version of a product monopolize the relative market
and thus earn positive prots. However, these prots have a temporary nature since
any monopolistic producer is doomed to be displaced by successive improvements in
her product line. The level of expected prots together with their expected duration,
as compared with the cost of research, determines the protability of undertaking R&D
in each line.
The plausibility of the symmetric equilibrium requires that each R&D industry be
equally protable, so that the agents happen to be indi¤erent as to where targeting their
investments. The prot-equality requirement implies two di¤erent conditions. First,
the prot ows deriving from any innovation need to be the same for each industry: this
is guaranteed by assuming that all the monopolistic industries share the same cost and
demand conditions. Second, the monopolistic position acquired by innovating needs to
be expected to last equally long across sectors: this requires that the agents expect the
future amount of research to be equally distributed among the di¤erent sectors. As is
well known to the reader familiar with the neo-Schumpeterian models of growth, future
is allowed to a¤ect current (investment) decisions via the forward-looking nature of the
Schumpeterian creative destructione¤ect.
Grossman and Helpman (1991, p.47) recognize the centrality of the assumption of
symmetric expected R&D investments in order to justify the selection of the symmetric
equilibrium: with the assumption that the prot ows are the same for all industries
[..] an entrepreneur will be indi¤erent as to the industry in which she devotes her R&D
e¤orts provided that she expects her prospective leadership position to last equally long
in each one. We focus hereafter on the symmetric equilibrium in which all products
are targeted to the same aggregate extent. In such an equilibrium the individual
entrepreneur indeed expects prot ows of equal duration in every industry and so
is indi¤erent as to the choice of industry. Hence, in this framework it is crucial to
assume that an equal amount of future R&D e¤orts in each industry is expected.
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Expecting equal future protability across sectors, however, does not constitute a
su¢ cient condition for each agent to choose a symmetric allocation of R&D e¤orts:
in fact, equal future protability makes the investor indi¤erent as to where targeting
research. As a result, when symmetric expectations are assumed the allocation prob-
lem of investments across product lines is indeterminate. Notice also that the way this
allocation problem is solved is not always without consequence for this class of models,
as recently pointed out by Cozzi (2003). For instance in a Segerstroms (1998) frame-
work, because of the increasing complexity hypothesis, the alternative prevalence of
the symmetric or asymmetric equilibrium has powerful e¤ects on the growth rate of
the economy: if indi¤erent agents, for a whatever reason (a sunspot), are induced to
allocate their investment only in a small fraction of sectors, the dynamic decreasing
returns to R&D investments will imply a lower aggregate growth rate, as compared to
the one associated with a symmetric distribution of R&D e¤orts across all sectors. An
equally relevant e¤ect of sunspot-driven asymmetric R&D investments on steady-state
growth rates reappears in the Howitts (1999) extension to an ever expanding set of
product lines (see Cozzi (2004)). Hence both solutions to the strong scale e¤ectprob-
lem (Jones (2004)) exhibit dependence of growth rates on the intersectoral distribution
of R&D.
In this paper we provide an alternative route to make the focus on the symmetric
equilibrium compelling. Our basic idea is that the agents beliefs on the future (per sec-
tor) distribution of R&D investments are characterized by uncertainty (or ambiguity),
in the sense that information about that distribution is too imprecise to be represented
by a (single additive) probability measure. The traditional distinction between risk
and uncertaintytraces back to Frank Knight (1921), and states that risk is associated
with ventures in which an objective probability distribution of all possible events is
known, while uncertainty characterizes choice settings in which that probability dis-
tribution is not available to the decision-maker. As is well known, the axiomatization
of the subjective expected utility (SEU) model, provided among the others by Sav-
age (1954), strongly contributed to undermine any meaningful distinction between risk
and uncertainty. In recent years a number of attempts have been made to extend the
SEU model in order to substantiate that distinction1. Here we will follow the maxmin
expected utility (MMEU) theory axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)2. In
1For instance Bewley (1986) has developed his theory of the status quo, by dropping the axiom
of complete preferences inside the Anscombe-Aumanns (1963) version of the SEU model.
2Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) provide an axiomatic foundation of the maxmin expected utility
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representing subjective beliefs, it suggests to replace the standard single (additive)
prior with a closed and convex set of (additive) priors. The choice among alternative
acts is determined by a maximin strategy. For each act the agent rst computes the
expected utilities with respect to each single prior in the set and picks up the minimal
value. Finally she compares all these values and singles out the act associated with the
highest (minimal) expected utility. According to this model, the agent is said to be
uncertainty averse if the given set of priors is not a singleton3. Hence, in our framework
the decision maker will be assumed to maximize her expected pay-o¤ with respect to
the R&D investment decision, while singling out the worst choice scenario, that is, the
minimizing probability distribution over the future conguration of R&D investments.
Unlike in Epstein and Wang (1994), in this paper the maxmin decision rule eliminates
indeterminacy and makes the symmetric - and growth maximizing - allocation of R&D
investment emerge as the unique equilibrium.
Importantly, our assumption on the agents ignorance does not regard any fun-
damental of the economy and is to be interpreted as a way of treating sector-specic
extrinsic uncertainty. Moreover, since uncertainty does not a¤ect aggregate variables,
in order to develop our argument we do not need to introduce either the optimal con-
sumption problem solved by households, or the prot-maximizing problem solved by
rms (for which the reader is referred to Segerstrom (1998)). Since the problem is the
distribution of a given amount of R&D e¤orts across product lines, all we need is the
description of the R&D sector.
Our result holds for a however small probability that a however small fraction of
individuals portfolio be a¤ected by strong uncertainty. Hence, a microscopic depar-
ture from the standard treatment of extrinsic uncertainty rules out the possibility of
asymmetric equilibria and the potential macroscopic growth consequences associated
with them.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briey describe the
basic structure of the R&D sector, with particular reference to the Segerstroms (1998)
theory in the framework of Anscombe and Aumann (1963). Several applications of this theory have
been elaborated over the last few years. We recall, among the others, Epstein and Wang (1994),
and the book by Hansen and Sargent (2003). Notice that, still in the Anscombe-Aumanns (1963)
framework, a taste for uncertaintycan alternatively be modeled via the Choquet expected utility
(CEU) theory axiomatized by Schmeidler (1989). In it, expected utility is computed according to a
capacity (that is, a not necessarily additive probability) via the Choquet integral. MMEU and CEU
can bring the same results when the capacity is convex.
3Notice however that this denition of uncertainty aversion has been questioned, and some alter-
native denitions have been proposed (see for example Epstein (1999)).
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formalization. In Section 3 we explain the core of our argument, enunciate and prove
the proposition. In Section 4 we conclude with some remarks.
2 R&D Sector
In this Section we provide a description of the vertical innovation sector, which is basi-
cally common to most neo-Schumpeterian growth models. This sector is characterized
by the e¤orts of R&D rms aimed at developing better versions of the existing products
in order to displace the current monopolists4. We assume a continuum of industries
indexed by ! over the interval [0; 1]. There is free entry and perfect competition in
each R&D race. Firms employ labor and produce, through a constant returns tech-
nology, a Poisson arrival rate of innovation in the product line they target. Adopting
Segerstroms (1998) notation, any rm j hiring lj units of labor in industry ! at time t
acquires the instantaneous probability of innovating Alj=X(!; t), where X(!; t) is the
industry-specic R&D di¢ culty index.
Since independent Poisson processes are additive, the specication of the innova-
tion process implies that the industry-wide instantaneous probability of innovation
is ALI(!,t)/X(!; t)  I(!; t), where LI(!; t)=
P
j lj(!; t). The function X(!; t) de-
scribes the evolution of technology; as in Segerstrom (1998), we assume it to evolve in
accordance with:
X(!; t)
X(!; t)
= I(!; t);
where  is a positive constant. Then, by substituting for I(!; t) into the expression
above and solving the di¤erential equation for X(!; t) we get:
X(!; t) = X(!; t0) + A
tR
t0
LI(!; z)dz
Whenever a rm succeeds in innovating, it acquires the uncertain prot ow that
accrues to a monopolist, that is, the stock market valuation of the rm: let us denote it
with v(!; t). Thus, the problem faced by an R&D rm is that of choosing the amount
of labor input in order to maximize its expected prots5:
max
lj
[v(!; t)Alj=X(!; t)  lj]
4It seems irrelevant to our purpose to distinguish whether the monopolistic sector is that of the
nal goods - as in Segerstrom (1998) - or that of the intermediate ones - as in Aghion and Howitt
(1998, Ch.3) and Howitt (1999).
5We consider labor as the numerarie.
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which provides a nite, positive solution for lj only when the arbitrage equation
v(!; t)A=X(!; t) = 1 is satised. Notice that in this case, though nite, the size of the
rm is indeterminate because of the constant return research technology.
The rms market valuation at a given instant t, v(!; t), is the expected discounted
value of its prot ows from t to +1:
v(!; t) =
+1R
t
(s) exp

 
sR
t
[r() + I(!; )] d

ds,
where
I(!; ) =
ALI(!; )
X(!; )
=
ALI(!; )
X(!; t0) + A
R
t0
LI(!; z)dz
.
By plugging I(!; ) into v(!; t), we nally obtain the following expression for v(!; t):
v(!; t) =
+1R
t
(s) exp
8>>><>>>: 
sR
t
26664r() + ALI(!; )
X(!; t0) + A
R
t0
LI(!; z)dz
37775 d
9>>>=>>>; ds (1)
The usual focus on the symmetric growth equilibrium is based on the assumption
that the R&D intensity I(!; ) is the same in all industries ! and strictly positive.
The suggestion of a new rationale for this symmetric behavior is the topic of the next
Section.
3 The Re-Foundation of the Symmetric Equilib-
rium
We assume that the agent has a fuzzy perception of the future conguration of R&D
e¤orts, and formalize this ambiguityvia the MMEU approach: this agent is then
provided with a set of prior beliefs over this conguration, and evaluates her expected
pay-o¤ with respect to the minimizing prior inside this set.
Before proceeding with the analysis, let us clarify two important aspects of the
models structure. In the previous Section we have referred to the R&D rm as the
one choosing the size and the distribution among sectors of R&D investment. However,
R&D rms are nanced by consumerssavings, which are channeled to them through
the nancial market. Thus, since the consumer is allowed to choose the R&D sectors
where to employ her savings, she ends up with being our fundamental unit of analysis.
The role of the R&D rms merely becomes that of transforming these savings into
research activity.
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Notice also that in the basic set-up by which our paper is inspired (Grossman and
Helpman (1991) and Segerstrom (1998)), the agent is assumed to be risk-averse. Yet she
is able to completely diversify her portfolio - by means of the intermediation of costless
nancial institutions - and, hence, to care only about deterministic mean returns.
This assumption is retained in our set-up - which allows for a whatever asymmetric
conguration of investments - since, in order to carry out this diversication, it is
su¢ cient to allocate investments in a non-zero measure interval of R&D sectors (and not
necessarily in the whole of them), according to a measure that is absolutely continuous
with respect to the Lebesgue measure of the sector space. The crucial di¤erence with
respect to the standard framework is then concerned with the assumption of multiple
prior beliefs in the face of uncertainty, where uncertainty only a¤ects the mean return
of the R&D investment and not its volatility, against which the agent has already
completely hedged.
In order to make the focus on the symmetric equilibrium compelling we start by
assuming that a symmetric future conguration of R&D investment is expected to
occur with probability 1 p, while p stands for the aggregate probability of all possible
congurations; the interval [0; p] represents the unrestricted set of priors assigned to
each of them. Following the MMEU approach, if there exists a conguration, among
all possible ones, which minimizes the expected returns in R&D investment, then the
minimization of the agents pay-o¤with respect to the unrestricted set of priors implies
the assignment of probability p to the minimizing conguration and of probability 0 to
all the others. Since the minimizing conguration is a function of the agents investment
choice, this choice can then be formalized as the result of a two-player zero-sum game
characterized by:
 theminimizing behavior of a malevolent Nature, which selects the worst possible
conguration of future R&D e¤orts and
 the maximizing behavior of the agent, whose optimal choice must take into ac-
count the worst-case strategy implemented by Nature.
We start our analysis at the beginning of time t = t0, and assume that, at this time,
all industries share the same di¢ culty index X(!; t0) = X(t0) 8! 2 [0; 1] in order to
focus on the role of expectations on the kind of equilibrium that will prevail. Our
problem can then be stated as follows. At time t = t0, the agent is asked to allocate a
given amount of R&D investment among all the existing industries: in maximizing her
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expected pay-o¤ she will take into account the minimizing strategy that a malevolent
Naturewill be carrying out in choosing the composition of future R&D e¤orts. We
denote with lm(!; t0)  lm(t0)[1 + (!)] the agents investment in sector ! at time
t0, and with LI(!; t)  LI(t)[1 + "(!)] the agents expectations about the aggregate
research in sector ! at a generic point in time t. lm(t0) and LI(t) are, respectively,
the agents average investment per sector at t0 and the expected average research per
sector at a generic t. "() and () represent relative deviations from these averages
satisfying:
1R
0
"(!)d! = 0
1R
0
(!)d! = 0 and
"(!)   1 (!)   1:
The presence of the two functions () and "() is intended to allow for asymmetry
both in the agents investment and in expected research6. Note that () and "()
are unbounded above because the zero-measure of each sector allows the investment
in any of them to be however big, without violating the constraint on the total R&D
investment.
From now on we will drop the argument t0 in the expression for7 lm(!; t0) and
enunciate the following:
Proposition 1 For a however small probability (p) of deviation ("(!)) from symmetric
expectations on future R&D investment, decision makers adopting a maxmin strategy
to solve their investment allocation problem, choose a symmetric investment strategy,
i.e. lm[1 + (!)] = lm 8! 2 [0; 1]. The associated distribution of expected R&D e¤orts
among sectors is: LI(t)[1 + "(!)] = LI(t) 8! 2 [0; 1].
Proof. Our problem can be stated as:
max
()
264 1R
0
(1  p)lm[1 + (!)] A
X(t0)
v(t0)d! + pmin
"()

1R
0
lm[1 + (!)]
A
X(t0)
v(!; t0)d!
375
6These denitions imply:
1R
0
LI(t)[1 + " (!)]d! = LI(t) = L(t)
1R
0
lm(t)[1 +  (!)]d! = L(t)lm(t)
where L(t) denotes the mass of agents in the economy at time t. With reference to Section 2 the
following relation between lj and lm holds:
1R
0
P
j lj (!; t) d! = L(t)lm(t):
7As we show below, this does not imply any loss of generality.
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s.t.
1R
0
"(!)d! = 0;
1R
0
(!)d! = 0;
(!) 2 [ 1;1); "(!) 2 [ 1;1);
with:
v(t0) =
+1R
t0
(s) exp
8>>><>>>: 
sR
t0
26664r() + ALI()
X(t0) + A
R
t0
LI(z)dz
37775 d
9>>>=>>>; ds
v(!; t0) =
+1R
t0
(s) exp
8>>><>>>: 
sR
t0
26664r() + ALI()[1 + "(!)]
X(t0) + A
R
t0
LI(z)[1 + "(!)]dz
37775 d
9>>>=>>>; ds
where we have substituted for LI(!; t)  LI(t)[1 + "(!)] into (1).
By plugging the expressions for v(t0) and v(!; t0) into the maxmin problem, and
by using the condition
1R
0
(!)d! = 0, that problem can be restated as:
max
()
8><>:(1  p)lm AX(t0)
+1R
t0
(s) exp
264  sR
t0
0B@r() + ALI()
X(t0)+A
R
t0
LI(z)dz
1CA d
375 ds +
+pmin
"()
1R
0
lm[1 + (!)]
A
X(t0)
8><>:
+1R
t0
(s) exp
264  sR
t0
0B@r() + ALI()[1+"(!)]
X(t0)+A
R
t0
LI(z)[1+"(!)]dz
1CA d
375 ds
9>=>; d!
9>=>;
Notice that the rst addend of the maximand is constant with respect to () and
"(). Then our problem can ultimately be stated as:
p
A
X(t0)
max
()
8>>>><>>>>:min"()
1R
0
lm[1 + (!)]
8><>:
+1R
t0
(s) exp
264  sR
t0
0B@r() + ALI()[1+"(!)]
X(t0)+A
R
t0
LI(z)[1+"(!)]dz
1CA d
375 ds
9>=>; d!
9>>>>=>>>>;
s.t.
1R
0
"(!)d! = 0 ;
1R
0
(!)d! = 0;
(!) 2 [ 1;+1); "(!) 2 [ 1;1).
Notice that this problem admits the same solution for a however small probability
p.
In order to prove that the unique equilibrium is provided by (!) = "(!) = 0
8! 2 [0; 1], we will proceed through the following steps (the reader can refer to Figure
1, where c1,c2,c3,c4 represent the agents pay-o¤s).
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Figure 1: The Game between the Agent and Nature
1. We will rst prove that, if the agent plays a symmetric strategy, (!) = 0
8! 2 [0; 1], then the worst harm Nature can inict to the agent is also associated with
a symmetric strategy: "(!) = 0 8! 2 [0; 1] (that is, with reference to Figure 1: c1 < c2)
2. We will then prove that, if Nature chooses "(!) = 0 8! 2 [0; 1], the pay-o¤ the
agent will obtain is independent of her investment strategy (that is, c1 = c3).
3. Then the problem is to exclude that, if (!) 6= 0 in a non-zero measure set, the
conguration "(!) = 0, 8! 2 [0; 1] represents a minimizing strategy for Nature (which
would leave the problem indeterminate). We will be able to exclude all asymmetric
congurations of the agents investment by proving that, for all of them, Nature can
cause a worse damage (with respect to the one associated with "(!) = 0 8! 2 [0; 1])
to the agent by playing an asymmetric strategy (that is, we will prove c4 < c3). Then
the conguration given by (!) = 0 and "(!) = 0 8! 2 [0; 1] will emerge as the unique
equilbrium (since c1 = c3 > c4). Let us proceed step by step.
1. (c1 < c2). If (!) = 0 8! 2 [0; 1], we rst show that the function:
 
1R
0
lm
8><>:
+1R
t0
(s) exp
264  sR
t0
0B@r() + ALI()[1+"(!)]
X(t0)+A
R
t0
LI(z)[1+"(!)]dz
1CA d
375 ds
9>=>; d!
is a sum over ! of strictly convex functions in "(!). In fact, set:
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f("; )   
0B@r() + ALI()[1+"(!)]
X(t0)+A
R
t0
LI(z)[1+"(!)]dz
1CA
Since
@2f("; )
@"2
> 0, then f("; ) is strictly convex8. As a result, the function
F ("; s) 
sR
t0
f("; )d , as a sum of strictly convex functions, is also strictly convex, that
is:
@2F ("; s)
@"2
> 0. Now, for each s 2 [t0;+1], we can dene:
H("; s)  lm(s) exp [F ("; s)] :
If we compute the second derivative of this function we obtain:
@2H("; s)
@"2
= lm(s)
(
exp [F ("; s)]

@F ("; s)
@"
2
+ exp [F ("; s)]
@2F ("; s)
@"2
)
;
which is always strictly positive since, as we have shown above,
@2F ("; s)
@"2
> 0.
Then H("; s) is also strictly convex and so it is the sum of all H("; s) over t 2 [t0;+1).
Finally, given that  is a sum over ! 2 [0; 1] of strictly convex functions then, by
Jensen inequality, the minimum is only reached when "(!) = 0 8! 2 [0; 1].
The following pay-o¤, obtained by setting "(!) = (!) = 0 8! 2 [0; 1] in :
1R
0
lm
8><>:
+1R
t0
(s) exp
264  sR
t0
0B@r() + ALI()
X(t0)+A
R
t0
LI(z)dz
1CA d
375 ds
9>=>; d!
is then the one that the agent can surely obtain if she plays a symmetric strategy.
2. (c1 = c3). If "(!) = 0, 8! 2 [0; 1], then the agent would be totally indi¤erent in
the allocation of her R&D e¤orts. In fact, the maximum problem obtained by setting
"(!) = 0 8! 2 [0; 1] is:
max
()
1R
0
lm[1 + (!)]
+1R
t0
(s) exp
264  sR
t0
0B@r() + ALI()
X(t0)+A
R
t0
LI(z)dz
1CA d
375 dsd!;
which, since
1R
0
(!)d! = 0, always gives the same constant value:
lm
+1R
t0
(s) exp
264  sR
t0
0B@r() + ALI()
X(t0)+A
R
t0
LI(z)dz
1CA d
375 ds:
8It is
@2f("; )
@"2
=
2A2LI()X(t0)
R 
t0
LI(z)dz
A(1+"(!))
R 
t0
LI(z)dz+X(t0)
3 > 0 since "(!)   1:
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3. (c4 < c3). Assume (!) 6= 0 for some non zero measure set of ! 2 [0; 1]. Then
the Natures minimum problem with respect to "() can be stated as follows:
min
"()
1R
0
lm[1 + (!)]
8><>:
+1R
t0
(s) exp
264  sR
t0
0B@r() + ALI()[1+"(!)]
X(t0)+A
R
t0
LI(z)[1+"(!)]dz
1CA d
375 ds
9>=>; d!
s.t.
1R
0
"(!)d! = 0
The solution to this problem is "[(!)], which is the reaction function of Nature,
that is, her optimal (minimizing) response to any possible value of (!). We do not
need, however, to nd it explicitely since our conclusion will follow straightforwardly.
We can build the Lagrangian and then derive the rst-order conditions (f.o.c.):
L =
1R
0
lm[1+(!)]
8><>:
+1R
t0
(s) exp
264  sR
t0
0B@r() + ALI()[1+"(!)]
X(t0)+A
R
t0
LI(z)[1+"(!)]dz
1CA d
375 ds
9>=>; d!+

1R
0
"(!)d!
For every ! 2 [0; 1], the f.o.c. with respect to " are:
lm[1+(!)]
+1R
t0
(s) exp
264  sR
t0
0B@r() + ALI()[1+"(!)]
X(t0)+A
R
t0
LI(z)[1+"(!)]dz
1CA d
375 ds"  sR
t0
ALI()X(t0)
X(t0)+A(1+"(!))
R 
t0
LI(z)dz
2d
#
=
=  
It results that, if (!) 6= 0 for some ! 2 [0; 1], and if the constraint
1R
0
(!)d! = 0
holds, the necessary conditions for a minimum can never be satised if "[(!)] = 0
8! 2 [0; 1]9.
To sum up, the agent perfectly knows the pay-o¤ she will gain while playing a
symmetric strategy (c1). She also knows that, for a whatever asymmetric strategy she
plays, Nature has a punishment powerassociated with an asymmetric strategy, which
renders her pay-o¤ strictly lower than the one associated with symmetry. The agent
will then choose (!) = 0 8! 2 [0; 1] and, consequently Nature will select "(!) = 0
8! 2 [0; 1].
We now show that our result also holds true when the punishment power of Nature
("(!)) is restricted to be however small. Accordingly, we impose the constraint "(!) 2
9In fact, consider an economy with only two sectors, !1,!2. If it were "(!1) = "(!2) = 0, the
satisfaction of the f.o.c. and the constraint would require (!1) = (!2) and (!1) + (!2) = 0,
which proves that there cannot exist ! where (!) 6= 0:
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[ ; ] 8 2 (0; 1).
Corollary 2 For a however small probability (p) of deviation ("(!)), and for a however
small deviation ("(!)) from symmetric expectations on future R&D investment, deci-
sion makers adopting a maxmin strategy to solve their investment allocation problem,
choose a symmetric investment strategy, i.e. lm[1 + (!)] = lm 8! 2 [0; 1]. The asso-
ciated distribution of expected R&D e¤orts among sectors is: LI(t)[1 + "(!)] = LI(t)
8! 2 [0; 1].
Proof. The same proof as for the proposition holds true under the restriction "(!) 2
[ ; ], since "(!) = 0 2 [ ; ] for a however small . In fact, since "(!) = 0 is always
an inner point of the domain, the non-fulllment of the f.o.c. guarantees that it is not
a minimum.
We have shown that, even under "() and p however small, the symmetric equilib-
rium emerges as the unique optimal investment allocation. That is to say, even though
the agent is almost sure(p ! 0) of facing a symmetric conguration of future in-
vestments (which would leave her in a position of indi¤erence in her current allocation
problem), the mere possibility of a slightly di¤erent conguration (" ! 0) makes her
strictly prefer to equally allocate her investments across sectors. This occurs because,
whenever the agent evaluates an asymmetric allocation of her current investments, she
will always be induced to expect the worst conguration of future investments inside
the "-generated set. Furthermore, the fact that the symmetric equilibrium is being
derived at the beginning of time t = t0 does not result in any loss of generality. In fact,
this equilibrium guarantees that the di¢ culty index X(!; t) starts growing at the same
rate - and is therefore always equal - across sectors. This condition in turn assures that,
at any point in time t, the agent continuosly faces a decision problem equivalent to
the one we have analyzed and, hence, continuosly nds the same optimal (symmetric)
solution.
4 Concluding Remarks
In the neo-Schumpeterian growth models the existence of the creative destruction e¤ect
implies that expectations on future R&D investments a¤ect the allocation of the current
ones. Therefore the usual focus on the symmetric equilibrium in the vertical research
sector relies on the assumption of an expected symmetric per-sector distribution of
13
R&D expenditure. However, in making the agents indi¤erent as to where targeting their
investments, this assumption is not su¢ cient to pin down univocally the symmetric
structure of R&D e¤orts: actually, symmetric expectations on future R&D leave the
current composition of R&D investments indeterminate, with potentially large e¤ects
on growth rates.
We have shown that a possible solution to this indeterminacy consists of assum-
ing uncertainty on the future conguration of R&D investments and max-minimizing
agents in the face of this uncertainty. Under this assumption, indeterminacy van-
ishes and the symmetric allocation of the vertical research expenditures emerges as the
unique optimal choice.
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